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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-CONFLICT OF LAWS--EFFECT IN JURISDICTION
HAVING No ARBITRATION STATUTE OF AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY EXTaA-STATE
ARBITRATION STATUTE.- New York corporation and a citizen of Ohio
entered into a contract for the furnishing and exhibition of motion picture
films. The contract contained a clause which provided that any dispute
which arose should be submitted to a specified board of arbitration and
that the parties would abide by the decision and award of this board.
This contract was, by its terms, to be construed in accordance with a Now
York statite which made such agreements to arbitrate enforceable and
irrevocable. There was no such arbitration statute in Ohio. The defend-
ant broke the contract and refused to arbitrate, but the arbitration board
proceeded to make an award after submission of the dispute by the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff sued in Ohio for damages based on this award. The
defendant demurred on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not
enforceable in Ohio. The lower court overruled the demurrer, and gave
judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of the award. The decision
was reversed on appeal. The court held the arbitration agreement to be
unenforceable under the law of Ohio, and indicated further that the de-
fendant's refusal to submit his claims to the arbitration board rendered
the award of that body ineffective. Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Dis-
tributing Corporation, 172 N, E. 689 (Ohio 1929).
At common law an arbitration agreement is revocable,' but a mere re-
fusal to arbitrate does not constitute an adequate revocation: Definite and
unmistakable notice of such revocation must be given.2 In the absence of
a valid revocation, an drbitral award is conclusive of the issues involved. 8
Even if made in ex parte proceedings, granting proper procedure of the ar-
bitral board, such an award is conclusive both at common law 4 and under
the New York arbitration statute. Since the defendant in the instant case
neither pleaded proper notice of revocation, nor questioned the propriety
of the proceedings of the arbitral board, it would seem that, whether the
instant agreement was governed by the common law of the forum or the
statutory law of New York, the court was bound to overrule the demurrer,
and any declaration as to the general validity of the arbitration agreement
in Ohio was quite superfluous. The court's view of the case, however,
required a decision of the question, never before presented, of whether a
state which has no arbitration statute will recognize an agreement to abide
by the arbitration statute of another state. In a jurisdiction having such
Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 48 S. E. 696 (1904). See Blodgett Co.
v. Behe Co., 190 Cal. 665, 667, 214 Pac. 38, 39 (1923).
2 Goodwine v. Miller, 32 Ind. 419 (1869) ; Fooks v. Lawson, 1 Mary. i1b,
40 Atl. 661 (Del. 1893).
3 N. P. Sloan Co. v. Standard Chemical & Oil Co., 256 Fed. 451 (C. C. A.
5th, 1918). Contra: Conant v. Arsenault, 119 Me. 411, 111 Atl. 578 (1920).
Boring v. Boring, 2 W. Va. 29.7 (1867).
5Matter of Finsilver, Still & Moss, 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).
Similar statutes exist in Conn., Iowa, La., Mass., Mich., Minn., Nov., N. C.,
Utah, and Wyo. See STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AwARD (1930)
§ 207.
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a statute stay of trial will generally be granted until the foreign arbitra-
tion has taken place,7 although an order to proceed with such foreign ar-
bitration will usually be refused8  The instant court, on the other hand,
uninfluenced by any local statute, classified the agreement as purely reme-
dial and hence governed by the law of the forum.0 This classification of
arbitration agreements as purely procedural would appear highly ques-
tionable.10 Such agreements have been generally recognized in England
as substantive.", A similar view seems to prevail in New York where the
Court of Appeals not only refused to declare without reservation that a
foreign arbitration agreement might be carried into effect through court
appointment of an arbitrator in accord with the law of the forum, but
suggested that if the state in which an arbitration was to take place had
'been specified, the law of that state would have been applicable rather than
the le. fori.13 It would seem on the whole that the number of arbitration
statutes recently enacted, and the general trend of modern judicial opinion
favoring arbitration agreements 1 4 point to a decrease in the opposition
to their ready enforcement-a tendency to which the limitation attempted
in the instant decision stands in marked contrast.
6 Twelve jurisdictions have statutes which enforce agreements to submit
future disputes to arbitration: Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 72, § 1; CAL. CIV. CODE
(Deering, 1923) § 1280; Conn. Pub. Acts 1929, c. 65, § 1; Ku. REV. LAWS
(1925) § 2924; La. Acts 1928, no. 262, § 1; MASS. Cunt. STAT. (1927), c.
251, § 14; N. H. Laws 1929, c. 147, § 1; N. J. CoLIP. STAT. (Cum. Supp.
1925) c. 9, §§ 1-22; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 2, §§ 1-10; Pa.
STAT. (Supp. 1928), § 606a-1; R. 1. Laws, 1929 c. 1408, § 1; 43 STAT. 883
(1925), 9 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1927). Fifty-one jurisdictions have statutes
which permit the arbitration of existing disputes. For a full discussion of
these statutes and their interpretation by the courts see STURGS, Op. Cit.
supra note 5, at c. 7.
7 Matter of Inter-Ocean Food Products, Inc. v. York Mercantile Co., 20G
App. Div. 426, 201 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't 1923); Danielson v. Entre
Rios By., 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. C. Md. 1927). Contra: The Silverbrool, 18
F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927); The Beechwood, 35 F. (2d) 41 (S. D. N.
Y. 1929).
8 Matter of California Packing Corporation, 121 Misc. 212, 201 'N.
Y. Supp. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1923) ; The Silverbrook, supra note 7.
9 This seems to be the general rule. Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C.
R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914) ; Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foder-
stof Kompagniet v. Rederidktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 Fed. 935 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918). See Bed Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 204 U. S. 109, 123, 125,
44 Sup. Ct. 274, 277, 278 (1923).
10 See Heilman, A'bitration Agreements and the Conflict of Laws (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 617. Cf. CORsIN, CAsES ON CoNrs (1921) 1475n.
11 Spurrier v. LaCloche, [1902] A. C. 446; Pena Copper Mines, Ltd. v.
Rio Tinto Co., Ltd., 105 L. T. R. 846 (1912).
IMarchant v. Mead Morrison Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929).
1 Ibid. 293, 169 N. E. at 389. Cf. Estate Property Corporation v. Hud-
son Coal Co., 132 Misc. 590, 596, 230 N. Y. Supp. 372, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1928),
in which the court based its decision on an interpretation of the foreign
arbitration statute.
14 See Ezell v. Rock Mountain Beam & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac.
680 (1925) (no statute); Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed.
319, 322 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Bed Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
supra note 9, at 121, 44 Sup. Ct. at 276, 277 (1923). Gf. Note (1928)
28 COL. L. Rmv. 472, 476.
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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO
THE BAR.-An applicant for admission to the New York Bar, during his
appearance before the Committee on Character and Fitness, was asked:
"Who discovered America?" and "What are the expressed powers reserved
to the United States Government under the Constitution?" Upon his
respectful refusal to reply to either question, the Committee declined to
certify him as qualified for admission. The applicant then sought and was
granted a judicial order directing the Committee so to certify, the court
holding that the Committee had exceeded its jurisdiction by inquiring into
legal or academic knowledge. Application of Brennan, 243 N. Y. Supp.
705 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1930).
In order to assure to the public the efficient and proper conduct of its
legal affairs, every state makes proof of moral fitness 1 a condition prece-
dent to admission to practice,2 though some few jurisdictions neglect to
indicate in what manner such fitness shall be determined.$ Under the sim-
plest and most generally used system of character investigation, practically
the sole criterion of an applicant's moral fitness is his ability to produce
a specified number of affidavits 4 signed by eligible individuals.5 The
necessity of relying solely on character testimonials which the applicant may
have been able to procure from prejudiced or irresponsible persons is ob-
viated by the requirement, in force in some jurisdictions, that each can-
didate register and submit proof of character before commencing his study
of the law.6  Here at least the opportunity for actual observation is
created.7 An interesting elaboration of this system, proposed by the Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners in California, would place each law student under
the tutelage of an attorney engaged in active practice, whose duty it would
be to inculcate an understanding of the ethics and duties of the profession,
and ultimately to certify to the authorities his estimate of the applicant's
character.8 If, as has also been suggested, candidates were admitted to
1 See Coleman, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar (1929)
15 A. B. A. J. 769, 772; Lightner, A More Complete Inquiry Into the Moral
Character of Applicants for Admission to the Bar (1913) 38 A. B. A. REr.
775, 778 (defining "moral fitness" as applied to the lawyer).
2 See Holmgren, A Synoysis of the Present Requirements for Admiosion
to the Bar in the States and Territories of the United States (1928) 5 Am.
L. S. REv. 735, 736; rules listed in HOLMGREN, RULES FOR ADmISSION TO TIlE
BAR (1930) 35, 44, 47, 66, 70.
2 See rules listed in HOLMGREIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13 (Ariz.), 15
(Ark.), 53 (Ind.).
4 See rules ligted in HOLIGREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25 (Conn.), 38
(Ga.), 81 (Mich.), 138 (Ore.). Several counties in Connecticut also make
further inquiries.
5 See rules listed in HOLMGREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21 (in Colorado
three affidavits are required; one from a member of the bar, one from a
business man, and one from an attorney, known personally to some mem-
ber of the Bar Committee), 55 (in Iowa character is certified by the dis-
trict judge or clerk of the District Court), 81 (Michigan accepts the diplo-
ma of a reputable law school as presumptive evidence of character).
6 See rules listed in HOLMGREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 108 (N. J.), 141
(Pa.), 182 (Wash.).
7 Some states obtain the same result by requiring applicants to file proof
of character a long time before the day of examination. See rules listed
in HOLAMGREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 129 (Ohio), 134 (Okla.).
81 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, PROCEEDINGS (1928) 197.
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practice for a probationary period preceding final admission,9 or if only
term licenses, renewable on proof of good behavior were granted,1 o legal
character could be tested under the fire of actual practice. Only a few
states have followed New York in its establishment of a specialized com-
mittee for character investigation, before which each applicant must per-
sonally appear." The purpose of such a requirement must be to enable the
committee to observe the general bearing of the applicant, as largely indi-
cated by his manner of responding to oral questioning. Thus, while an
erroneous answer to an inquiry involving legal or academic learning should
not necessarily disqualify an applicant, any restriction on the committee's
choice of questions constitutes a limitation of its opportunity to stimulate
responses -which might, in manner rather than substance, be indicative of
the applicant's character.
BANKRuPTCY-PRIoRrry BASED ON TRANSFER OF PnYsmArL AssmrS.-The
defendant corporation -was organized to take over a bankrupt hotel company
under a plan approved by the equity receivers of the hotel, pursuant to a
court order which allocated stock to the hotel's stockholders and assenting
creditors but made no provision for nonassenting creditors. The hotel
property was conveyed to the defendant subject to a first mortgage, but
p30,000 of working capital was raised by means of a second mortgage.
Prior to the defendant's bankruptcy, foreclosure of the first mortgage ab-
sorbed the full value of the hotel property, so that the defendant's trustee
in bankruptcy received none of the physical property of the original hotel
company. The state of New York sought to collect from the defendant
- license tax due from the hotel company and claimed priority under
Section 64(b) (6) of the Bankruptcy Act, providing that states shall have
priority as regards taxes legally due. The District Court disallowed this
claim and the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground
that, although the state could not be allowed priority under Section
64(b) (6), its claim merited preference under Section 64(b) (7) as "a debt
owing any person who by the law of the states is entitled to priority."
In re Alemac Operating Corporation, 42 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
The court assumes that a corporation organized to take over the assets
of an insolvent corporation is liable to non-assenting creditors of the in-
solvent to the extent of the assets so received., Under such circumstances
the state's preferentidl right against the bankrupt carries over as against
the new corporation.2 Such preferential rights, however, have in general
been based on an actual transfer of "physicaP assets to the new corpora-
9 See Rutter, Bar E.aminations in Relation to Adwisaion RcquircNicnts
(1929) 54 A. B. A. REP. 688, 696; REED, REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION
(1929) 30.
1 REED, op. cit. supra note 9, at 29.
"1 See rules listed in HOLMGREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6 (Ala.), 38
(Conn.), 47 (Ill.), 62 (Ky.), 77 (Mass.), 116 (N. Y.). In Connecticut
recommendation must be secured from the local county bar association, sev-
eral of -which have character committees.
1 Okmulgee Window Glass Co. v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. Sth, 1919)
(assets of old corporation held by new corporation in trust for creditors of
old corporation); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct.
554 (1913) (judicial sale not binding on non-assenting creditors); Ameri-
can Railway Express Co. v. Kentucky, 190 Ky. 636, 228 S. W. 433 (1921).
2 In re Grand Leader, 5 F. (2d) 509, 511 (N. D. Tex. 1925) (two cases).
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tion.3 In the instant case the court could find no transfer of "physical"
assets 4 and held that the obligation of the defendant was not to pay "a
tax legally due," but rather "an obligation imposed by law upon a con-
structively fraudulent grantee." The defendant's position was thus
considered analogous to that of one who has agreed to pay the tax
of another, and under such circumstances the state has no preferential
right.5 This seems to be a reversion to the earlier and more literal con-
striiction of the Bankruptcy Act by which governmental right to priority
in general was closely circumscribed.4 The Bankruptcy Act, revised I to
overcome this tendency and clarify the order of priority, now states in
Section 64(b) (7) that prior payment shall be made "of all debts owing
to any person who by the laws of the States or of the United States is
entitled to priority: Provided, That the term 'person' shall include . . .
the several States." 8 Since the common law of New York provides that
the state has succeeded to the crown's prerogative of priority as to all debts
due the state 9 the instant court felt itself bound to grant the state prior-
ity under this latter Section. Thus the claim of the state is subordinated
to "taxes legally due" and is set one step lower in the scale of priorities.
But although under New York law this holding does not destroy the state's
preferential right over general creditors,O if adopted as a precedent in
other jurisdictions it would place an obstacle in the way of governmental
attempts to claim priority for tax payments where the law of the forum
does not give express preference to the government.". This obstacle seems
out of harmony with the intent of the Bankruptcy Act -which recognizes
the vital function of tax collection for revenue purposes by, granting it
priority. Furthermore, in holding Section 64(b) (6) inapplicable, the in-
stant decision adopts the idea of property as a physical res, and although
an equity of redemption would not qualify as property under this theory,
the defendant was able to raise $30,000 on the equity which it received
from the hotel company.
3Ibid; Heyward v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924);
Evered v. St. Croix Mines Corp., 285 Pac. 1008 (Utah 1930).
4 Due to the foreclosure of the first mortgages on the property trans-
ferred.
5Hardeman v. Hendryx, 29 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
G United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U. S.
549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1922) (corporation which is instrumentality of
United States denied priority); Davis v. Pringle, 268 U. S. 315, 45 Sup.
Ct. 549 (1925) (priority of United States limited to taxes); Matter of
Stewart, 6 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 741 (D. N. D. Referee, 1925) (same limita-
tion for state); (1926) 39 HARe. L. RBv. 767. See Blair, Priority of United
States in Equity Receiverships (1925) 39 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6.
7 May 27, 1926. See McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act
(1927) 40 HAnv. L. REv. 341, 345.
844 STAT. 666 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A. § 104b(7) (1927).
9 Matter of Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912);
Matter of Niederstein, 154 App. Div. 238, 138 N. Y. Supp. 952 (2d Dep't
1912); Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. 143 (1920).
10 The court holds that there are no taxes legally due in the instant
case. Hence no claims are given preference over the state's.
"' City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U. S. 174, 39 Sup. Ct. 186 (1919). Of.
In re Fahnstock Mfg. Co., 7 F. (2d) 777 (W. D. Pa. 1925); In re Green
River Jockey Club, 5 F. (2d) 259 (W. D. Ky. 1925) (subsisting valid liens
entitled to priority over tax claims).
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CORPORATIONS--CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICERS AND DInECTORS
FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRUST FUNDS-A corporation, as trustee, held
certain mortgages to secure notes owned by third parties. The defendants
as officers and directors of the corporation deposited money paid on these
notes into the general account of the corporation. They were indicted for
embezzlement under Section 6515 of the Connecticut General Statutes [1918]
which provides that every trustee of an express trust who wrongfully
appropriates to his own use the money of such trust shall be fined or im-
prisoned. A finding of guilty was reversed on appeal, the court holding
that the statute was inapplicable since the defendants as individuals were
not the trustees. State v. Parker, 151 Atl. 325 (Conn. 1930).
A corporate officer or director cannot ordinarily escape criminal respon-
sibility for his acts on the ground that they are the acts of the corpora-
tion and hence impersonal,1 although the corporation is not thereby freed
of responsibility for the same acts.2 In cases arising under the bankruptcy
laws and somewhat analagous to the instant case, officers and directors
have been held responsible as aiders and abetters of, and even conspirators
with, the corporation.3 And corporate officers and directors have occasion-
ally been subjected to an almost vicarious criminal liability for the offenzes
of employees. 4 Since in the foregoing cases the concept "corporate entity"
does not appear to have been usefully employed save as a device for stating
results reached by independent considerations,s the question arises whether
the instant case presents any consideration tending to justify the inter-
vention of that concept to deprive the court of its power to punish the
proper parties. The responsibility for the conversion here was easily
traceable to the officers and directors, who had the physical management of
the trust in their hands and hence in reality occupied the position of trus-
teese whereas responsibility in other situations is frequently imposed for
IMilbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N. W. 252 (1909); State v. Thomas,
123 Wash. 299, 212 Pac. 253 (1923). See Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 781.
2 New York Central R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 481, 29 Sup. Ct.
304 (1909); Crall & Ostrander v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 855, 49 S. E.
683 (1905). See Edgerton, Corporate Crimindml RespWtsibility (1927) 3G
YALE.. L. J. 827, 833.
3 Kaufman v. United States, 212 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) (held as aid-
ers and abetters); United States v. Young & Holland Co., 170 Fed. 110 (C.
C. R. 1. 1909) (held as conspirators). Contra: United States v. Lae, 129
Fed. 499 (E. D. Ark. 1904); Field v. United States, 137 Fed. 6 (C. C. A.
8th, 1905). See, Lee, Corporate Criminal Respoubibility (1928) 28 COL.
L. REv. 1, 24-28.
4 Cf. Overland Cotton Mills v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 Pac. 924 (1904);
People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mlich. 471, 40 N. W. 735 (1890);
State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199, 128 Pac. 218 (1912). The liability is not,
from one aspect, totally vicarious, for the officer or director, by due and
diligent supervision, might have prevented the act of the subordinate. See
Lee, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16, for a discussion of these cases.
5 See Lee, op. cit. supra note 3, at 198. Cf. Comment (1926) 36 YAMn
L. T. 254, 259; Sturges, Uricwrparatcd Associations as Parties to Action,
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 383, 396, 405.
G Compare the statement in HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
(1923) 201, that "all corporate transactions and all propositions re-
lating to the law of corporations can be stated in terms of ultimate physi-
cal realities" and the statement in the instant case that the defendants
"actively managed, directed, and controlled the affairs of the company,
comprising the entire board of directors and all of the officers."
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offenses resultant from the unified action of the stockholders. Moreover,
the alternative of suit against the already failing corporation would, if
successful, impose an excessive and vicarious penalty upon the general
creditors and stockholders and would yet be ineffective as a deterrent
against future conversions of a like character.
EmiNENT DOMAIN-EVIDIENCE OF FuTuRE IIPROVEMIENTS AS A F ACTOR
IN MARKET VALu.-In an eminent domain proceeding to condemn certain
land for park purposes, the defendants claimed that the availability of
the land for apartment house sites should be considered in determining its
market value. The track lacked streets, sewers and other improvements
necessary for the erection of apartment houses, but the defendants offered
in evidence a plan of development which included these improvements. The
lower court sustained the condemnor's objection to the admission of this
evidence on the ground that the land was unimproved and that the pro-
posed plan had not been approved by the city.. On appeal it was held
(two judges dissenting) that the evidence should have been admitted. In
1'e Inwood Hill Park, 243 N. Y. Supp. 63 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1930).In eminent domain proceedings proof of market value is said to be
limited to demonstration of the present condition of the land sought to be
appropriated and the uses to which it is naturally adapted, and hence not
to embrace inquiries as to uses to which the land might be applied if im-
provements and changes were made., Thus evidence as to what expense
would be necessary to drain land in order to render it suitable for build-
ing purposes has been held incompetent.2 And it has been held reversible
error for a trial court to permit the introduction in evidence of a plan
for the reclamation and irrigation of swamp lands.3 Land is said not to
be presently available for a particular use when the possibility of its being
applied to that use depends upon the affirmative action of some agency
which the owner does not control.4 Accordingly, testimony as to the value
of land for wharf purposes has been held inadmissible where the party
claiming compensation had no wharf franchises as has proof of realty
value for a manufacturing site where the requisite co-operation of a rail-
road had not been assured.6 Under the authority of these cases, not only
was the land in the instant case in its existing condition unfit for the pro-
posed use but the improvements necessary to fit it for that use could not
have been made without the approval of the city. The decision, as well
as being unorthodox, seems unnecessarily harsh in that it appears to
countenance the basing of an enhanced condemnation value on a remote
and speculative possibility of enhanced actual value.
INSURANCE-WAR RISK INSURANCE-INTERET.-In an action on a policy
of life insurance issued by the United States to soldiers and sailors pursu-
ant to an amendment to the War Risk Insurance Act of 1914, the plain-
tiff recovered a judgment which included, inter alia, interest on installments
I See City of Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 34 Pac. 224 (1893);
Richmond & Petersburg Electric Ry. v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 103 Va. 399,
49 S. E. 512 (1905); 2 LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 709.
2 Manda v. City of Orange, 82 N. J. L. 686, 82 Atl. 869 (1912).
3San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Stevinson, 63
Cal. App. 767, 220 Pac. 427 '(1923).
4 See Darlington v. Pennsylvania Ry., 278 Pa. 307, 313, 123 Atl. 284,
286 (1924).
S Central Pacific R. R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. f47 (1868).




due. On an appeal taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals that tribunal
certified to the Supreme Court of the United States the question of whether
interest was allowable upon such installments. The Supreme Court
answered this question in the negative. Uvitcd States . Worlcy, 281 U. S.
339, 50 Sup. Ct. 291 (1930). The Circuit Court of Appeals thereupon di-
rected that the judgment be modified by eliminating therefrom all interest
charges, thus adopting the view of the Supreme Court that the amend-
ment did not provide that such interest should be paid, and that no agree-
ment on the part of the government to pay interest could be implied.
United States v. Worley, 42 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
Interest is generally not allowable on claims against the United States
except where the liability therefor is expressly assumed by statute or by
contract.' A further exception was added, however, by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,2 in which the
court allowed interest to be assessed on a policy of marine insurance
issued by the government pursuant to the War Risk Insurance Act of
1914.3 Judicial attempts to reconcile this decision with the decisions deny-
ing interest on life policies 4 issued under the amendment z to the War
Risk Insurance Act are unconvincing. It has been argued that the United
States entered the marine insurance business for commercial purposes and
should, therefore, be subjected to the ordinary business liability of insur-
ance companies, whereas life insurance issued to soldiers and sailors was
both insurance and a pension and consequently subjected the government to
no liability for interest.6 But since both types of insurance were author-
ized by the War Risk Insurance Act as amended, it would seem that the
purpose of Congress in providing them was the same in each instance,
namely, to promote the general welfare of the people in war times;; and
not to bestow a gratuity on favored classes in either cases The fortuitous
circumstance that the government realized a profit on the marine insur-
ance 9 is hardly decisive as to its conuercial character, for the government
stood ready to pay all losses arising on the policies, however great.20 .
'See Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 487, 46 Sup. Ct.
428, 432 (1926); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S.
41, 47, 49 Sup. Ct. 52, 53 (1928); United States v. North American Co.,
253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518 (1919) (no recovery of interest on an im-
plied contract); cf. United States v. Rogers, 255 U. S. 163, 41 Sup. Ct.
281 (1921) (interest recoverable in condemnation proceedings as part of just
compensation).
2267 U. S. 76, 45 Sup. Ct. 211 (1924).
3 38 STAT. 711 (1914), 38 U. S. C. A. § 502 (1927).
4 United States v. Worley, 281 U. S. 339, 50 Sup. Ct. 291 (1930) ; United
States v. Lyke, 19 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927); United States v.
Jackson, 34 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929), aff'd, Jackson v. United
States, 281 U. S. 344, 50 Sup. Ct. 294 (1930).
-40 STAT. 398, 409 (1917), 34 U. S. C. A. §§ 171, 502 (1927).
6 See United States v. Worley, supra note 4, at 343, 50 Sup. Ct. at 293;
United States v. Lyke, supra note 4; United States v. Jackson, Mipra note 4.
See preamble of War Risk Insurance Act, supra note 3.
* Since only American vessels were insured under the War Risk Insur-
ance Act, it might be argued that this insurance was also in the nature
of a subsidy. See War Risk Insurance Act, supra note 3.
9 ANuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES Vn nsiN's
BuREAU (1923) 675.
10 $5,000,000 were appropriated to this end in 1914 by the War Risk
Insurance Act, supra note 3, at § 7.
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Further, the same provision was made for suit to enforce both the life
and the marine policies."1 It thus seems quite illogical to refuse interest
to the soldier's dependent while allowing the shipowner to collect, and it
is believed that the Supreme Court's refusal to tax interest against the
United States in the life insurance cases can reasonably be interpreted
-only as a recession by that court from the position taken in the Standard
,Oil case. 2
INSURANCE-WHAT CONSTITUTES "VEXATIOUS REFUSAL TO PAY."-In a
suit on a fire insurance policy, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff
had no insurable, interest, and that the loss was due to an explosion which
had not been caused by fire. The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed
-a penalty against the insurer under a statute providing that if an insur-
ance company has vexatiously refused to pay a loss the court may 'award
-the plaintiff, in addition to the amount of the loss, damages not exceeding
ten per cent of such amount, plus a reasonable attorney's fee. [Mo. REV.
STAT. (1919) § 6337]. On appeal it was held, inter elia, that although
the defendant had produced evidence at the trial from which it might be
inferred that the loss was caused by an explosion, there was nothing in
the record to show that the defendant had been in possession of such evi-
dence at the time of the refusal to pay, and hence that the court did not
-err in submitting to the jury the question of vexatious refusal to pay.
Buffalo Insurance Co. v. Bommarito, 42 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
A wilful refusal to pay, without foundation in law or in fact in the
view of a reasonably prudent man, is generally said to be vexatious,1
-under statutes similar to that involved in the principal case? Under so
broad a definition the question obviously becomes one of degree, depend-
ent upon the facts of the individual case. A verdict in favor of the in-
sured on the policy does not determine that the insurer's refusal to pay
-was vexatious.3 But arbitrary 4 or dilatory 6 dealings, or unethical pro-
11 War Risk Insurance Act, supra note 3, at § 5; Amendment, supra note
5, at § 405.
12 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 2.
' See Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. MeCranie, 12 Ga. App. 858, 78 S. E. 1115
(1913); Patterson v. American Ins. Co., 174 Mo. App. 44, 160 S. W. 59
(1913).
2See GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 2549; TENN. ANN. CODE (Shan-
mon, 1917) § 3340a and 3340a(1) (a corresponding and reciprocal provi-
sion in favor of the insurer); cf. Tax. CoMP. STAT. (1928) art. 4736; On.
LAWS (Olsen, 1920) § 6353 (more prevalent types of statutes fixing a
penalty in all cases where the insurer has failed to pay the loss within
the period specified by the policy, or by the statute).
3 Weston v. American Ins. Co., 191 Mo. App. 282, 171 S. W. 792 (1915);
zf. Lafont v. Home Ins. Co., 193 Mo. App. 543, 177 S. W 1029 (1916).
Contra: Central Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Graham, 24 Ga. App.
199, 99 S. E. 434 (1919).
4 Murray v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 265 S. W. 102 (Mo. App. 1924) (de-
fendant failed to investigate facts before refusing to pay); Leer v. Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co., 250 S. W. 631 (Mo. App. 1923) (attempt to coerce
insured into settlement by overbearing and threatening conduct).
5 Avery Vt. Mechanics Ins. Co., 222 Mo. App. 31, 295 S. W. 509 (1927)
(failure to return premiums although insurer insisted policy was void ab
initio). But cf. Mackey v. Home Ins. Co., 284 S. W. 161 (Mo. App. 1926).
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cedure 6 on the part of the insurance company refusing to pay, warrants
the imposition of the statutory penalty. And while an insurer may with
impunity litigate a disputed point of laW7 or a meritorious issue of fact,
a defense which lacks substance and is based solely on technicalities evi-
dences a lack of good faith in the refusal to pay.O What constitutes suffi-
dent substance to create a meritorious issue of fact has presented an
especially nice point for judicial consideration.10 The instant case raises
a further problem, never before directly considered, concerning the time
when the insurer must be in possession of the facts substantiating his
reason for refusing to pay. It has been held that a strong suspicion af-
fords justification for a refusal to pay, even though the facts suspected
were not made a part of the insurer's defense when the case came to
trial.l. A fartioii the fact that the insurer has obtained in support of
that suspicion evidence which is produced at the time of the trial tends
to establish the good faith of his earlier refusal. According to the hold-
ing of the instant case, however, an insurer, lacking time to obtain ade-
quate and available evidence, might be forced to pay a loss within the
specified period, however strong or bmia fide his doubts as to the merit
of the insured's claim. Furthermore, it has been uniformly held that it
is unnecessary for the insured to adduce affirmative proof of a vexatious
refusal to pay in order to collect the penaltyj - Yet the principal case
would seem to require that the insurer, in order to avoid the penalty,
produce affirmative proof that he was in possession of the evidence negativ-
ing his liability at the time of the refusal to pay.
PLEADING--"THEoRY OF THE PLEADINGS" AS BARRING AmE xIuMENT I
FEDERAL CouRT.-The defendant city sold certain land to the plaintiff de-
velopment company without disclosing that it knew the land to be unfit
for residential purposes. Subsequently, the city passed an ordinance pro-
hibiting the use of this tract for residences. By a bill in equity the
plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and rccover inciden-
tal damages, on the ground that the land was suitable for residential
purposes. The defendant showed conclusively that periodic flooding made
the land unfit for residence-a fact unknown to the plaintiff. The trial
court dismissed the bill, holding that under the circumstances the ordi-
nance was a proper exercise of the police power and that there was there-
fore no ground for relief in equity. Thereafter, the plaintiff unsuccess-
6 Collins v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 215 Mo. App. 683, 285 S. W. 783
(1926) (fraudulent conduct on the part of defendant's adjuster).
T Silliman v. International Life Ins. Co., 135 Tenn. 646, 188 S. W. 273
(1916); Commercial Casualty Co. v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Co., 32 F.
(2d) 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
sAufrichtig v. Columbia Natural Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249 S. W.
912 (1922).
9 City of Maplewood v. Southern Surety Co., 19 S. W. (2d) 691 (Mko.
1929).
10 The court found "substantial evidence," although the verdict was for
the insured, in Campbell v. National Fire Ins. Co., 269 S. W. 645 (Mo.
App. 1924), and Smith v. Aetna NFire Ins. Co., 269 S. W. 682 (Mo. App.
1924). But of. Malo v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 282 S. W. 78 (Mo. App.
1926).
,1 7 Silliman v. International Life Ins. Co., 135 Tenn. 646, 188 S. W. 273
(1914); of. Columbian Natural Life Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 12 F. (2d) 986
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
2 Patterson v. American Ins. Co., supra note 1.
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fully sought leave to amend the complaint to make it conform to the
findings and thus include an obvious claim of fraud. The upper court
affirmed the decision of the trial court, and justified the dismissal on the
ground that the plaintiff had chosen a wrong theory of recovery. It also
approved the denial of a right to amend, because the desired amendment
furnished neither additional ground for equity jurisdiction, nor a valid
basis for an action at law without a shift in the "theory" of the com-
plaint. America Land Co. v. City of Keene, 41 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A.
1st, 1930).
The concept of a cause of action as a convenient aggregate of the oper-
ative facts1 has given rise to new pleading policies, Thus, a correct
"theory of the pleadings" is no longer considered. essential 2 in jurisdictions
which uphold any judgment consistent with the issues and the evidence.0
And amendments changing the "theory of the pleadings" are there freely
allowed if based on the same general facts as those alleged in the original
pleading.4  Most federal courts have adopted' these liberal views both
in regard to causes of action 6 and amendments,7 and the Supreme Court
of the United States has flatly abandoned the "law to law" theory as. a
test for amendments 3 Under broadly permissive federal provisions,9 plead-
ings have been amended to conform to the findings,10 even where the
findings have raised a new issue.11 Equity Rule 22 12 specifically permits
a transfer of cases improperly commenced in law or equity and precludes
any dismissal of a suit brought mistakenly in equity when there is an
adequate remedy at law. 3 Furthermore, Section 274 (a) of the Judicial
*'See Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. 1. 817, 837;
Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 879; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (1896) § 30.
But cf. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614.
2 Cf. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) §§ 43, 76. See Brown v. Baldwin,
46 Wash. 106, 114, 89 Pac. 483, 486 (1907), where the court says: "An
applicant for justice is not to be turned out of the temple of justice,
scourged with costs, because he happened to come in at one door instead
of the other."
3 See Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States (1921)
10 CALIF. L. Rav. 202, 212, 219.
4 For list of cases, see Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 853.
5 Conformity Act, 17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1927).
6 DOME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 596.
7 DoB E, op. cit. supra note 6, at 711; Ashland Waterhouse Co. v. City
of Ashland, 251 Fed. 492 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
8 Frederichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 207, 38 Sup. Ct. 450 (1918); N. Y.
Central & H. R. R., v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122 (1922).
9 Equity Rule 19, 198 Fed. xxiii (1912), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1927).
Cf. District of Columbia v. Washington Terminal Co., 47 Ct. of App. D. 0.
570 (1918) (motion for amendment allowed under a mandate from ap-
pellate court after the term of the deciding court had expired).
10 Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 190 Fed. 602 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1911).
U"Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (D. C. Pa. 1916).
22 198 Fed. xxiv (1912), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1927).
13 See Brown v. Rossove, 255 Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Louisiana
Agricultural Corp. v. Pelican Oil Refining Co., 256 Fed. 822 (C. C. A.
5th, 1919), certiorari denied, 250 U. S. 646, 39 Sup. Ct. 494 (1919). See
Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rav. 66.
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Code 14 provides for the liberal use of amendments to effectuate a trans-
fer to the other calendar of a suit improperly brought.' 5 The instant
case, in ruling in opposition to the spirit of these tendencies, has sub-
jected the plaintiff to delay, needless costs, and the risk of being barred
from the courts by a limitation statute. Even the manner of adoption of
the theory view is open to criticism in that the court failed to define the
limits of the procedural penalty it will in the future impose for the use
of a wrong theory. Thus it did not indicate whether an erroneous over-
ruling of an objection made to the admission of evidence, the granting
of an amendment, or a ruling on demurrer, as founded on the theory
view, would necessitate a new trial and so penalize a litigant for an error
on the part of the trial court. Nor did the instant court signify whether
an otherwise sustainable objection of this sort, delayed until after the
verdict, would be held a defect of substance rather than form and hence
a ground for reversal. Even if restricted to the specific holding, the revival
of the "law to law" test imperils the transfer of cases improperly com-
menced since such a transfer generally entails a change in theory. Thus,
although the actual decision was probably prompted by the reluctance of
the court to countenance this sort of recovery against a municipality, as
a matter of substantive law, it is unfortunate that the holding should
have been so expressed as to further a retrogressive procedural tendency.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COM.,PANY TIO
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL OF ADDRESSEE FOR NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION OF
TELEGRAm.-At the plaintiff's request his physician sent to a bacteriologist
a culture taken from the plaintiff's daughter for examination and tele-
graphic report. The return telegram, on which the plaintiff's physician
relied to administer a curative dose of anti-toxin, read: "Redding culture
received diphtheria." The telegram as written had read: "Redding cul-
ture negative diphtheria.' The anti-toxin had serious deleterious effects
upon the child and suit was brought against the telegraph company for
injuries and mental anguish suffered through its negligence. The upper
court, in upholding the lower court's award of damages, held that the
plaintiff was the undisclosed principal of the sender as well as of the ad-
dressee and that the telegraph company therefore owed the plaintiff a
duty of care in the transmission of the message. Western Union v. Red-
ding, 120 So. 743 (Fla. 1930).
The courts in denying recovery to the undisclosed principal of the ad-
dressee for the negligence of telegraph companies in transmitting tele-
grams ' have strayed into a labyrinth of legal fiction. They reason that
the injury to the plaintiff must have been the probable and proximate
result of the defendant's negligence; 2 that the person injured must, there-
' 438 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A. § 397 (1927). Cf. Webb v. South-
ern Ry., 235 Fed. 578 (S. D. Ala. 1916).
15 See Hicks Co. v. Moore, 261 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Tucker-
man v. Means, 262 Fed. 607 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1919).
'Western Union v. Schriver, 141 Fed. 538 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905), noted
in (1906) 4 L. R. A. (N. s.) 678; Western Union v. Lowden, 116 Miss.
379, 77 So. 145 (1918); BuRDIcK, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1926) 581, n. 32.
But see Western Union v. Potts, 120 Tenn. 37, 51, 52, 113 S. W. "789, 792
(1908) (suggesting that the undisclosed principal of the addressee might
recover for actual damages but not for mental anguish).
2 See Western Union v. Schriver, supra note 1, at 540, 550; Barnett v.
Western Union, 287 S. W. 1064, 1068 (Mo. App. 1926); Edd v. Western
1930]
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fore, have been within the contemplation of the telegraph company; a that
the undisclosed principal of the sender is within this "contemplation," hav-
ing been privy to the contract between his agent and the company; 4 that an
undisclosed principal of the addressee, on the other hand, if he is suing
ex contractu, is barred from recovery by lack of privity 6 unless he was
also the principal of the sender 6 or a beneficiary sufficiently designated
within the telegram; T that if he is bringing his action ex detioto, recovery
is likewise barred 8 since telegraph companies, whether considered common
carriers of intelligence,9 independent contractors,1 0 or simply public corpo-
rations with certain public duties,11 owe no duty to the public in general
and have no notice of the undisclosed principal of the addressee in par-
ticular. The liability of telegraph companies, however, has gradually
been so extended that it may include the instant type of case where the
court can find that the undisclosed principal of the sendee, by construc-
tively authorizing a telegraphic reply, is also the undisclosed principal of
the sender and thus "within the contemplation" of the company.12 The
Tesult seems justifiable, even though the method of obtaining it is at best
over-elaborate. In the instant case, had the telegram in question been
sent to the principal directly instead of through the intermediary of his
agent, the court would have found no such difficult obstacles to surmount.10
Union, 127 Ore. 500, 505, 272 Pac. 891, 897 (1928); Western Union v. Tay-
for, 94 Fla. 841, 847, 114 So. 529, 531 (1927).
3 See Western Union v. Schriver, supra note 1, at 548, 550; Western
Union v. Brooks, 115 Tex. 168, 173, 279 S. W. 443, 444 (1926); Western
Union v. Taylor, supra note 2, at 848, 114 So. at 532. But see West-
ern Union v. Green, 153 Tenn. 522, 532, 284 S. W. 898, 899 (1926).
4See Western Union v. Schriver, supra note 1, at 547, 549; Western
Union v. Northcutt, 158 Ala. 539, 557, 48 So. 553, 558 (1909); Milliken v.
Wdstern Union, 110 N. Y. 403, 410, 18 N. E. 251, 252 (1888) ; cf. 2 MC0HEM,
LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 2059.
5 See cases supra note 4.
OHarkness v. Western Union, 73 Iowa 190, 34 N. W. 811 (1887); of.
Western Union v. Potts, supra note 1, at 45, 113 S. W. at 791.
7 Cf. Western Union v. Fulton, 211 S. W. 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Western Union v. Smith, 38 Ga. App. 26, 143 S. E. 147 (1928).
s See cases supra notes 4 and 6.
0 See Reaves v. Western Union, 110 S. C. 233, 239, 96 S. E. 295, 297
(1918); Western Union v. Brown, 294 Fed. 167, 170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
But of. Basila v. Western Union, 24 F. (2d) 569, 571 (S. D. Fla. 1928).
10 See Harper v. Western Union, 133 S. C. 55, 60, 130 S. E. 119, 120
(1925); Western Union v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. (2d) 103, 107 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927).
11 See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1114; Barnett v. Western
Union, supra note 2, at 1067.
12 Cf. WILLISTON, op. cit. surpa note 11, at § 83, for the proposition that
the person taking the initiative in using the telegraph authorizes its use
by the other party; Western Union v. Chihuahua Exchange, 206 S. W.
364, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (person first using the telegraph makes
the telegraph company an Agent for the purpose of communication).
13 See JoYCE, ELECTIc LAW (2d ed. 1907) § 1008; Western Union v.
Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S. W. 778 aff'd, 153 Tenn. 522, 284 S. W. 898
(1926) (statute); with which cf. Western Union v. Alfred, 4 S. W. (2d)
666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). In England, however, the courts find some
difficulty in allowing the addressee to recover. Cf. Dickson v. Reuter's
,Telegram Co., 37 L. T. 370 (1877); Blakeney v. Pegus (No. 2), 6 N. S. W.
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Thus liability might better have been imposed by a closer identification of
the plaintiff and his physician insofar as the purpose of the telegram was
concerned, especially since this nominal change in the identity of the ad-
dressee would scarcely have caused the defendant to have been more
careful in transmitting the message.
UsURYu-EmFFcT OF ACCELERATION CLAusE IN LoAN CoN CT.-Pursuant
to a loan by the defendants, the plaintiffs executed their note for the
principal, -with interest coupons at 12% for the first five years and 6M
for the last five. Both the notes and the deeds of trust given as security
stipulated that upon a default in the payment of any interest instalment,
or a breach of any covenant in the deeds, all the notes should become due
at the option of the legal holder. After discharging two coupons, the
borrowers sued to have the loan adjudged usurious and to recover double
the interest already paid, in accordance with the provisions of the usury
statute. [Tnx. Coip. STAT. (1928) art. 5073]. The Court of Civil Ap-
peals held the contract valid on the ground that the plaintiffs by their
performance could defeat the contingency upon the happening of which
alone usurious interest would accrue. The decision was reversed on ap-
peal, the Supreme Court holding that, under the Texas statute defining
interest as a sum allowed "for the use or forbearance or detention of
money" [TEx. Comp. STAT. (1928) art. 5069], the clause must be con-
sidered a stipulation for interest and not a mere penalty as at common
law. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 30 S. W. (2d) 282 (Tex.
1930).
Reluctant to apply the logic of the usury laws to bona fidc financial ar-
rangements, courts have held that where unlawful interest is payable only
upon a contingency going to the entire interest, there is no usury., And
if the contingency is within the borrower's control, as where it is stipulated
that upon default at maturity the interest will be increased beyond the
legal maximum, the contract has been held legal although in such case
the contingency affects only the excess interest.2 Furthermore the exer-
cise of an option to pay the principal before maturity does not taint the
loan with usury despite the payment of interest above the lawful rate if
reckoned as of the period of actual use of the money 3  In accord with
these principles, courts have almost universally sanctioned "acceleration
clauses" similar to those in the instant case.4 Indeed, the Texas Supreme
Court itself followed this view in three early decisions,5 but haq since
223 (1885). Inland communication by telegraph is now in the hands of
the Postmaster-General, who is not subject to suit. See POLLOCIC Ti
LAW OF ToRTs (13th ed. 1929) 576.
: Clift v. Barrow, 108 N. Y. 187, 15 N. E. 327 (1888) (partnership
agreement). See Hartley v. Eagle Insurance Co., 222 N. Y. 178, 118 N. E.
622 (1918); (1918) 18 COL. L. RBv. 284.
2 Law Guarantee & Trust Soc. v. Hogue, 37 Ore. 544, 62 Pac. 380 (1900).
See also Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. 205, 225 (U. S. 1830). Contra: Richard-
son v. Brown, 68 Tenn. 242 (1877).
3 Eldred v. Hart, 87 Ark. 534, 113 S. W. 213 (1908)'; Smithwick v.
Whitley, 152 N. C. 366, 67 S. E. 914 (1910).
4 Garland v. Union Trust Co., 63 Okla. 243, 165 Pac. 197 (1917); Goodale
v. Wallace, 19 S. D. 405, 103 N. W. 651 (1905); Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley,
87 Wash. 438, 151 Pac. 792 (1915). See also 3 WmLSTON, CoNTm crs
(1920) § 1696. Contra: Maxwell v. Jacksonville Loan & Improvement
Co., 45 Fla. 425, 34 So. 255 (1903).
5 Seymour Opera House Co. v. Thurston, 45 S. W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930]
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adopted the contrary rule 6 in consistent opposition to the Courts of Civil
Appeals.7 Though ostensibly based upon the wording of the statute,s this
deviation by the higher court seems to reflect a belief that such provisions
create an undesirable advantage against which borrowers should be pro-
tected 9 But the narrow rule thus established would tend toward a total
disregard of the bona fide use of the device.10 Undoubtedly a loan with
an acceleration provision is usurious if it can be proved that upon its
execution forbearance after maturity is mutually contemplated, with the
excessive interest regarded as the lender's commission."1 If, on the other
hand, the stipulation is a bona fide attempt to compel prompt payment by
fixing a penalty, which in any event would not be enforced unless conscion-
able,12 it appears unreasonable to attach to the loan the effects of usury.19
The instant decision may possibly have been prompted by an unusual pro.
valence of extortion from weak borrowers. Nevertheless the court, in
addition to opposing the great weight of authority, has failed to follow
a pronounced judicial tendency to indulge "legal usury" in the absence of
any corrupt intent, out of deference to established business methods.14
1898) (writ of error denied); Crider v. San Antonio Real Estate Building
& Loan Ass'n, 89 Tax. 597, 35 S. W. 1047 (1896); Dugan v. Lewis, 79
Tex. 246, 14 S. W. 1024 (1891).
6fDeming Investment Co. v. Giddens, 30 S. W. (2d) 287 (Tex. 1930)
(decided at same time as instant case); Shear Co. v. Hall, 235 S. W.
195 (Tex. 1921); Parks v. Lubbock, 92 Tex. 635, 51 S. W. 322 (1899).
7See Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 266 S. W. 612 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924); Shear Co. v. Hall, 215 S. W. 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Parks v. Lubbock, 50 S. W. 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899); Seymour Opera
House Co. v. Thurston, supra note 5. See also Note (1926) 4 Tax. L. REV.
519.
8 See Parks v. Lubbock, supra note 6, at 637, 51 S. W. at 323. But of.
Garland v. Union Trust Co., supra note 4, decided under a statute of iden-
tical wording. And see definition of "interest" in Bouvw, LAW DicoN-
ARY (8th ad. 1914)
9 Cf. 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGE S (4th ed. 1916) 999.
10 See Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., supra note 7, at 616;
Moore v. Cameron, 93 N. C. 51, 57 (1885).
11 See Union Mortgage Banking & Trust Co. v. Hagood, 97 Fed. 360,
363 (C. C. S. C. 1899); WEBB, USURY (1899) 90 et seq.
12 Dugan v. Lewis, supra, note 5; SUTHERLAND, Op. cit. supra note 9, at
869.
'13 See cases cited supra note 4.
14 See RYAN, UsuRY AND Usuy LAWS (1924) 12; Comment (1930) 39
YALE L. J. 408.
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